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AM BRO, Circuit Judge
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A77-297-574)

Argued June 29, 2004
Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 25, 2004)
Theodore N. Cox, Esquire
Joshua Bardavid, Esquire (Argued)
401 Broadway, Suite 701
New York, NY 10013
Attorney for Petitioner

Jian Lian Guo seeks review of the
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”) denying her motion to reopen
her immigration proceedings. Because we
conclude that the Board failed to
substantiate its decision and impermissibly
relied on a prior adverse credibility
determination unrelated to Guo’s petition
for asylum, we grant the petition for
r e vie w a nd r em a nd f or f ur th er
proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Guo is a native and citizen of
China. She entered the United States
without valid entry documentation on
January 3, 2000. On January 21, 2000, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(“INS”)1 charged her with removability
based on § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). At a
master calendar hearing on March 23,
2000, Guo conceded removability. The
same day she filed an application for
asylum based on religious persecution and
requested withholding of removal under
INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b), and
Article III of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture.2

Sunday school; she allegedly evaded arrest
and fled the country. Guo further claimed
to have left behind in China her first
husband, whom she had married in 1999
and whose whereabouts she did not know.
On August 2, 2000, an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denied Guo’s application for
asylum. The IJ found that Guo was not
credible. He concluded that her story was
fabricated and, even if true, would not
merit asylum. He also doubted Guo’s
professed ignorance of her first husband’s
location and speculated that he was in the
United States. He therefore denied her
application for asylum. Guo appealed, and
on October 29, 2002, the Board affirmed
without issuing a separate opinion.

Guo initially justified her
application for asylum on the basis of
religious persecution. She stated that she
had joined an “underground church” in
China in 1996 and was baptized in July
1997. In December 1999, government
officials purportedly sought to arrest her at
a church meeting where she was teaching

On January 21, 2003, Guo filed a
motion to reopen the immigration
proceedings base d on intervening
developments.
In March 2001, she
married Li Kang Chan in New York. On
January 15, 2002, their first child was born
in Manhattan. Later that year, Guo
discovered that she was again pregnant. 3
She thus claimed that she was entitled to
asylum based on China’s one-child family
planning policy; she feared that if she
returned to China she would be subject to
China’s forcible sterilization policy and
other penalties. In support of her motion
to reopen, Guo submitted a previous Board
decision granting reopening for a Chinese
applicant with two United States-born

1

On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to
exist as an agency within the Department
of Justice and the INS’s functions were
transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security. See Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441, 451 &
471, 116 Stat. 2135. The Board remains
within the U.S. Department of Justice.
2

The United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
implemented in the United States by the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242,
112 Stat. 2681-761 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1231).

3

The child was born on July 24, 2003,
after the Board issued its decision.
2

children, a new application for asylum, her
marriage certificate, the birth certificate of
her first child, a letter from her obstetrician
describing her pregnancy, and an affidavit
by retired demographer John Shields Aird,
Ph.D.

fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political
opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Forced abortion and
forced sterilization constitute persecution
“on account of political opinion.” INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). An
individual with a well-founded fear that
she will be forced to undergo a coercive
population control procedure of this sort or
be subject to persecution for failure to do
so has a well founded fear of persecution.
Id.

The Board denied the motion to
reopen on June 16, 2003, explaining that
Guo had “failed to meaningfully address
the negative credibility determinations
noted in the Immigration Judge’s
decision.” The Board’s opinion stated that
even if it “were to find her claim credible,
she has not established a ‘well-founded
fear’ that a reasonable person in her
circumstances would fear persecution” on
a protected basis. It concluded that the
evidence she had presented was
insufficient to establish that “officials
punish returning Chinese nationals who
are pregnant, have given birth to children
in foreign countries, or prohibit them from
having more children upon their return.”

An applicant bears the burden of
proving eligibility for asylum based on
specific facts and credible testimony. 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(a); Abdille v. Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001). In order
to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution, an applicant must satisfy three
requirements: (1) he or she has a fear of
persecution in his or her native country;
(2) there is a reasonable possibility that he
or she will be persecuted upon return to
that country; and (3) the applicant is
unwilling to return to that country as a
result of his or her fear. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(2)(i).4

The Board had jurisdiction over
Guo’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c). We have jurisdiction over her
timely petition for review pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252.
Discussion
I. Overview of the statutory framework

4

The eligibility threshold for
withholding of removal is even higher: the
Attorney General must determine that
repatriation will more likely than not
jeopardize the alien’s life or freedom on
account of one of the protected grounds.
INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
The applicant must therefore demonstrate
a “clear probability” of persecution.

Section 208(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b), confers on the Attorney General
discretion to grant asylum to an alien who
is a “refugee.” An individual qualifies as
a refugee if he or she is “unable or
unwilling” to return to his or her country
“because of persecution or a well-founded

3

Board determinations are upheld if
they are “supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4)). We will
reverse only if “the evidence not only
supports [a contrary] conclusion, but
compels it.” Id. at 481 n.1 (emphasis
omitted).
A d v e r s e c r e d ib i l i t y
determinations are factual matters and also
are reviewed for substantial evidence.
Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157,
161 (3d Cir. 1998). They likewise will be
upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

petitions for rehearing and
motions for a new trial on
the basis of newly
discovered evidence. This is
e s p e c i a l l y tr ue i n a
deportation proceeding,
where, as a general matter,
every delay works to the
advantage of the deportable
alien who wishes merely to
remain in the United States.
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)
(citations omitted). In light of these
considerations, our review is highly
deferential: we review the denial of a
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 323. “Discretionary decisions of the
[Board] will not be disturbed unless they
are found to be arbitrary, irrational, or
contrary to law.” Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580,
582 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).

In this case, we are asked to review
the Board’s denial of Guo’s motion to
reopen. As a general rule, motions to
reopen are granted only under compelling
circumstances. The Supreme Court has
explained:

II. Application to Guo
Guo makes two principal
arguments. First, she argues that the
Board erred in considering the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination, which was based
on facts unrelated to China’s family
planning policies. Second, Guo suggests
that the documents she submitted are
adequate to establish prima facie eligibility
for asylum—a reasonable likelihood that
she would prevail on the merits if a motion
to reopen were granted—and she contends
that the Board erroneously held her to a
higher standard. We agree with her on
both counts.

The granting of a motion to
reopen
is
.
.
.
discretionary. . . . [T]he
Attorney General has ‘broad
discretion’ to grant or deny
such motions. Motions for
reopening of immigration
proceedings are disfavored
for the same reasons as are

Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d
Cir. 1998). Given this higher standard, an
applicant who does not qualify for asylum
also does not qualify for withholding of
removal.

A.
Adve r s e
determination

4

c redib ility

In reviewing Guo’s initial petition
for asylum, the IJ deemed her testimony
not credible. The Board relied on that
adverse credibility determination in
evaluating her motion to reopen. Because
the basis for the IJ’s credibility assessment
was utterly unrelated to Guo’s later claim,
the Board erred by taking it into
consideration.

irrebuttably presumed to be false. But case
law does not support that once an applicant
is deemed uncredible, she is excluded from
making further, unrelated asylum claims.5
Nor does one adverse credibility finding
beget another. On the contrary, an IJ must
justify each adverse credibility finding
with statements or record evidence
specifically related to the issue under
consideration. We have emphasized that
adverse credibility findings are afforded
deference only if they are “supported by
specific cogent reasons.” Gao v. Ashcroft,
299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2002). Those
reasons “must be substantial and bear a
legitimate nexus to the finding.” Id.

Guo does not dispute that the IJ’s
credibility determinations were supported
by the record. Indeed, she would be hard
pressed to argue otherwise. The IJ’s ruling
contained seven distinct references to her
lack of credibility. The adverse credibility
findings were directly related to the central
events upon which Guo’s asylum claim
initially was based: her alleged religious
persecution.

Moreover, we are unable to imagine
a sufficient nexus between Guo’s suspect
testimony concerning her alleged religious
persecution and the Board’s conclusion
about China’s family planning policy. The
Government’s efforts to identify a

The legitimacy of an initial
credibility determination does not,
however, justify denial of all subsequent
applications for asylum. No one has
explained how the IJ’s adverse credibility
findings implicated Guo’s motion to
reopen on a ground not previously dealt
with by the IJ. Guo’s credibility (or lack
thereof) for religious persecution simply is
not relevant to her motion to reopen in this
case, which relied principally on the fact
of her second pregnancy in contravention
of China’s one-child policy and on China’s
practice of persecuting those who violate
the policy.

5

8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) provides that an
alien adjudged by the Attorney General to
have made a “frivolous application for
asylum,” as defined in the statute, will be
permanently barred from entering the
United States. There was no such finding
in this case. The protections afforded to
the alien under this provision, as well as
its relatively infrequent application,
indicate that Congress did not intend to
preclude an alien from reopening asylum
proceedings based solely on a prior
adverse credibility determination.

The Government’s argument
reduces to a bad-faith theory of asylum
law: once credibility is tarnished, all
successive asylum applications are

5

sufficient connection are unpersuasive.6
And indeed our Court (albeit in nonprecedential opinions), as well as the

Board itself in decisions discussed in the
next section, disconnect adverse credibility
from China’s family planning policy. See,
e.g., Cai v. Ashcroft, 63 Fed. Appx. 625,
2003 WL 1972020 (3d Cir. Apr. 29, 2003)
(remanding to the Board for
reconsideration of a denial of asylum
based on China’s family planning policy
where the petitioner, whom the IJ found
lacked credibility, had two children at the
time of filing and four at the time of her
motion for reconsideration); cf. Lin v. INS,
78 Fed. Appx. 784, 2003 WL 22454477
(2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2003) (reversing Board’s
denial of a motion to reopen, based on
adverse credibility finding, in light of a
new translation of a sterilization certificate
and an affidavit by Mr. Aird).

6

For example, the Government contends
that Guo’s credibility determination is
relevant because it implicated her
purported “family situation.” Namely,
“[t]he Immigration Judge was entirely
unconvinced by Guo’s description of the
status of her [first] husband, Yung Chu
Li.” To be sure, we find this aspect of
Guo’s story troublesome. Guo has not
indicated that she and her first husband
were divorced, and yet subsequent to her
initial hearing she married Li Kang Chan
in the United States and had two children
with him. But the Government has failed
to explain how Guo’s questionable marital
status is relevant to her asylum claim. She
is not seeking lawful immigration status
based on her marriage to Li Kang Chan.
And it is not disputed that Guo has two
children. Neither the identity of the
children’s father nor his relationship to
Guo has any bearing on her claim.
Similarly, b ecause the IJ suspected
that Guo “is here for different reasons
rather than because of religion,” the
Government argues that the adverse
credibility finding stemmed from his
suspicion that Guo’s true motivation for
seeking asylum was to remain in the
United States. This is simply speculative.
Moreover, we are unaware of any case that
holds that an applicant will be denied
asylum simply because building a better
life in America was a motivation for
leaving her country.

B . Well-founded
persecution

fear

of

Because we conclude that the Board
was not entitled to rely on the IJ’s prior,
unrelated adverse credibility determination
in denying Guo’s motion to reopen, we
evaluate the alternative basis for its
holding. The Board “note[d] that, even if
[it] were to find her claim credible, she has
not established a ‘well-founded fear’ that
a reasonable person in her circumstances
would fear persecution” within the
meaning of the statute. Our review of this
argument has two parts. We consider
whether the Board applied the correct
standard in assessing whether Guo
presented sufficient evidence, and we
determine whether the Board abused its
discretion in deeming the evidence
insufficient.

6

A motion to reopen must establish
prima facie eligibility for asylum. Sevoian
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 173, 173 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2002); Reyes v. INS, 673 F.2d 1087,
1089 (9th Cir. 1982). In Sevoian, we
explained that “the prima facie case
standard for a motion to reopen . . .
requires the applicant to produce objective
e v i d e n c e show ing a ‘re asona ble
likelihood’ that he can establish [that he is
entitled to relief].” 7 Id. at 175. The Board,
however, in its denial of Guo’s motion to
reconsider, stated that she must proceed to
end-game and “establish that there is a
pattern or practice [of enforcing the family
planning policy against Chinese nationals
with foreign-born children] in her
homeland” (emphasis added). In this
context, “establish” means the evidence
for asylum outweighs the evidence against.
A “reasonable likelihood” means merely
showing a realistic chance that the
petitioner can at a later time establish that
asylum should be granted. The distinction
may at first appear to be subtle shading,
but without it “prima facie” (meaning at
first sight) would lack meaning. Guo
argues that the evidence she submitted,
even if initially insufficient to establish
eligibility for asylum, at least satisfied the
prima facie evidence requirement.

Having concluded that the Board
held Guo to an excessively rigorous
standard, we might ordinarily remand for
application of the proper standard. But in
this case, we conclude as a matter of law
that the evidence submitted by Guo in
support of her motion to reopen constitutes
prima facie evidence.8 While we cannot

8

In Sevoian, we wrote that there are
three principal grounds on
which . . . the Board may
deny a motion to reopen
immigration proceedings.
First, it may hold that the
movant has failed to
establish a prima facie case
for the relief sought . . . .
Second, it may hold that the
movant has failed to
i n t ro d u c e p r e v i o u s ly
u n a v a i la b l e , mate rial
evidence that justifies
reopening . . . . Third, in
cases in which the ultimate
grant of relief being sought
is discretionary (asylum . . .
but not withholding of
deportation), the Board can
leap ahead over the two
threshold concerns (prima
f a c ie c a s e a n d n e w
e v i d e n c e /r e a s o n a b le
explanation) and simply
determine that even if they
were met, the movant would
not be entitled to the
discretionary grant of relief.

7

Prima facie scrutiny entails
consideration of “the evidence that
accompanies the motion as well as
relevant evidence that may exist in the
record of the prior hearing, in light of the
applicable statutory requirements for
relief.” Id. at 173.
7

yet say that Guo is entitled to asylum, we
are persuaded that she at least deserves a
hearing.

Second, the applicant must support
the objective reasonableness of her fear.
“Determination of an objectively
reasonable possibility requires ascertaining
whether a reasonable person in the alien’s
circumstances would fear persecution if
returned to the country in question.”
Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 469 (citing Chang v.
INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1997)).
While it is unclear precisely how likely
persecution must be to render an
applicant’s fear of future persecution wellfounded, “[o]ne can certainly have a well
founded fear of an event happening when
there is less than a 50% chance of the
occurrence taking place.” INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).

Thus in the following discussion we
do not reach the merits of Guo’s claim.
But we do explain the relevant tests under
applicable case law in support of our
conclusion that Guo has shown a realistic
chance of success on remand.
Whether fear of persecution is wellfounded turns, as a practical matter, on two
inquiries. First, an applicant must show a
subjective fear of persecution. She may
satisfy this prong by a showing that her
fear is genuine to her. Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003). A
primary means of showing that fear is
genuine is with credible testimony. Guo’s
statement that accompanied her motion to
reopen mentions that she “cannot go back
to China” because, “[i]f I was sent back to
China, I will be forcibly aborted. If I was
sent back after I delivered the second
child, either my husband or I will be
sterilized by [the] Chinese government
because we violated [its] family planning
policy.” This statement reveals that there
is a reasonable likelihood she will give
credible testimony that her fear is genuine.

Guo’s principal evidence regarding
China’s enforcement of its one-child
policy with respect to foreign-born
children was an affidavit of John Aird, a
former “specialist on demographic
developments and population policy in . . .
China.” The affidavit states that Chinese
couples returning home with unauthorized
children “cannot expect to be exempt”
from the family planning policy because
to ignore their violations
would tend to undermine the
enforcement of the rules in
China.
The Chin ese
authorities cannot afford to
let rumors get out that
couples of childbearing age
can evade the one-child
limit by leaving the country
illegally,
having
unauthorized children in
f or e ign countries and

Id. at 169-170 (citations and quotations
omitted). In this case, the Board gave no
indication that it was basing its decision on
either the second or third ground for
denying a motion to reopen. Furthermore,
we know of no reason why Guo’s motion
to reopen should be denied on either of
those grounds.

8

r e t u rn i n g h o m e
without suffering the
standard penalties.

Aird criticizes the 1998 Profile’s
reliance on “anecdotal” evidence. He
points to other sources, such as newspaper
articles, which indicate that the one-child
policy is indeed enforced against couples
with unauthorized foreign-born children.
He provides two specific examples of the
application of the policy to Chinese
couples returning from abroad.
In
addition, he emphasizes the interest of the
Chinese government in giving our State
De pa r tme nt “ a d ecep tively mil d
impression” of China’s policies. We
conclude that where a motion to reopen is
accompanied by substantial support of the
character provided by the Aird affidavit,
the Government’s introduction of a fiveyear-old State Department report, without
more, hardly undermines Guo’s prima
facie showing. Cf. Berishaj v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004).

Aird thus opines that “the concerns of
Chinese couples over what awaits them if
they are repatriated with children born
abroad without official permission are
probably in most cases well-founded.”
The affidavit cites seven sources.
Much of Aird’s affidavit is devoted to
discrediting one of them, the State
Department’s April 1998 Profile of
Asylum Claims and Country Conditions
for China (“1998 Profile”).
That
document reports that China’s one-child
fam ily planning policy varies in
implementation and that Fujian Province,
where Guo lived, is “lax” in its
enforcement of the policy (in some cases
permitting parents to apply after several
years to conceive a second child if their
first child is female). In fact, the 1998
Profile suggests that enforcement of the
policy is applied so “loosely” in Fujian
Province—exceptions to the one-child
policy “are becoming the norm” in rural
areas—that the province has been
criticized in the official press. More
importantly, the 1998 Profile discusses the
application of the one-child policy to
couples with foreign-born children and
c o n c l u d e s , b a s e d o n “ a n e c dota l
information,” that “the relevant authorities
do not always handle such situations
strictly. At least some couples that have
children in the United States beyond the
nominal limits and then return to China
are, at worst, given modest fines.”

Moreover, we agree with Guo that
the 1998 Profile, to the extent it is reliable,
actually may buttress her prima facie case.
The 1998 Profile states that the central
Chinese government
does not authorize physical
force to make people submit
to abortion or sterilization,
but there are reports that this
continues to occur in some
r u r a l a r e a s a s lo c a l
population authorities strive
to meet population targets.
Chinese
officials
acknowledge privately that
f o r c e d a b o r t io n s a n d
sterilizations still occur in
areas where family planning

9

personnel may be
uneducated and illtrained.

subsequent to initial asylum proceedings.
See, e.g., In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71
(BIA 1998) (reopening proceedings based
on Congress’s 1996 amendment of the
statutory term “refugee” to include a
person persecuted through coercive
population control measures), superseded
on other grounds by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 359 (BIA 2002); In re Lu, No. A
70 100 687 (BIA March 10, 2000) (Aird
affidavit “establishe[s] prima facie
eligibility for relief”); In re Qing Zhang,
No. A 73 148 366 (BIA Nov. 15, 2001)
(granting motion to reopen based on
statement by the applicant); In re Weng,
No. A75 990 618 (BIA July 18, 2003)
(granting motion to reopen under similar
circumstances); In re Zhang and Huang,
No. A77 551 826 (BIA July 16, 2003)
(sustaining petitioner’s appeal of IJ’s
de nia l of asylum under simila r
circumstances).

Moreover, the Board’s analysis failed to
account for differences in enforcement
based on an immigrant’s legal status in the
United States. The 1998 Profile references
anecdotal evidence to the effect that
“possession or lack of possession of U.S.
permanent resident status is the key
criterion for determining whether couples
are subject to family planning restrictions.”
It is true, as the Government
contends, that the Aird affidavit does not
demonstrate that any “specific proportion
or percentage” of couples returning to
China will be subject to its familyplanning policy, nor does Aird contest that
variations occur in enforcement. But that
is not Guo’s burden. While some couples
in Guo’s situation might avoid serious
repercussions upon returning to China, the
conflicting evidence suggests at least a
reasonable likelihood that Guo will
establish a reasonable fear of persecution.

These decisions overwhelmingly
deem allegations like Guo’s sufficient to
establish prima facie eligibility for asylum.
And while the Government argues that
Guo’s case is distinguishable “given the
paucity of facts alleged in her motion to
reopen,” applicants in many prior cases did
not cite more specific evidence than did
Guo. Furthermore, some submitted less
than Guo. We thus conclude that the
Board erred in finding that Guo presented
insufficient evidence to establish her
prima facie case.

What makes the Board’s decision
particularly suspect in this case is its
failure to comport with its own prior
decisions, many of which reach the
opposite conclusions under similar
circumstances. “[A]pplication of agency
standards in a plainly inconsistent manner
across similar situations evinces such a
lack of rationality as to be arbitrary and
capricious.” Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
265 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
The
Board on many occasions has granted
motions to reopen based on children born

Conclusion
The Board’s cursory rejection of
Guo’s motion to reopen was improper. It
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failed to explain how the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding bears any relation to
Guo’s claim, based on physician-verified
evidence of pregnancy and a third-party
affidavit, that she feared persecution
relating to China’s family planning policy.
Moreover, it seems likely that the Board
applied the wrong standard in evaluating
the motion to reopen. Guo made a prima
facie case: she presented facts showing a
reasonable likelihood that she would
prevail on the merits, particularly in light
of prior Board decisions granting relief
under similar circumstances. We thus
grant Guo’s petition for review and
remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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